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for the Kremlin and for Khrushchev personally,
more, to live and develop, and ultimately achieve Abd al-Karim] Qassem, or for [Egyptian presi- for he had committed himself to the preservation
a full victory over capitalism. dent Gamal Abdel] Nasser. So sharp, said Mao
of a socialist GDR during the post-Stalin suc-
Overall, the international situation is favor- Tse-Tung, are the conflicts inside the capitalist
cession struggle. (See James Richter, Reexam-
able for the socialist camp, underlined Mao Tse- world.
ining Soviet Policy Towards Germany during the
Tung. He said: Comrade Khrushchev and the Comrade Mao Tse-Tung expressed thanks
Beria Interregnum, CWIHP Working Paper No.
CC CPSU undertook good measures in relation to for the confidential report given to him. He
3.)
the United States of America. The imperialists, requested that we convey a big greeting to Com-
East German communists, led by Walter
Mao Tse-Tung added, have many weaknesses. rade N.S. Khrushchev, and to all members of the
Ulbricht, masterfully exploited Moscow s fears
They have serious internal contradictions. A Soviet party-government delegation, who had
of an East German collapse, edging the Soviets
rapid swell in the anti-imperialist liberation move- taken part in the celebration of the 10-year anni- toward a decisive confrontation with the West.
ment is occurring in Africa and Latin America. versary of the founding of the CPR.
For them the ultimate solution was the libera-
As far as Asia is concerned, continued Mao Tse- For my own part I thanked Comrade Mao
tion of West Berlin, removing its subversive
Tung, here on the surface there is a certain decline Tse-Tung for the conversation and in conclusion
influence as a powerful magnet for East Germans
[in the movement], explainable by the fact that in briefly told him about the progress toward fulfill-
and East Europeans in general. Recently declas-
many countries of Asia the national bourgeoisie ment of the economic plan of the USSR for 1959,
sified Soviet documents reveal how serious and
has already taken power. This has not taken place and also about the preparations which had begun
effective was the GDR leadership s pressure on
in Africa and Latin America. These two conti- in our country for the Plenum of the CC CPSU.
Khrushchev. It seems that the idea of a German
nents present for the USA, England, and France Mao Tse-Tung listened to this with interest.
peace treaty, announced by Khrushchev in No-
a source of trouble and tasks which are difficult to Comrade B.N. Vereshagin, Counselor of
vember 1958, was conceived by the GDR s So-
solve. the Embassy, and Yan Min-Fu, translator of the
cialist Unity Party (SED). [Ed. note: For further
Right then, Mao Tse-Tung again said that Secretariat of the CC CPC, were present at the
analyses of newly available Russian and East
during the meetings with Comrade Khrushchev conversation.
German materials on the Berlin Crisis, see
in Peking he had already articulated the thought
CWIHP Working Papers No. 5 (Hope M.
(on the way from the airport to the residence), that (Signed) S. Antonov, Temporary Charge d Affair
Harrison, Ulbricht and the Concrete Rose :
at the present time West Germany and Japan of the USSR in the CPR
New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of So-
represent the main danger to us and to the matter
viet-East German Relations and the Berlin Cri-
of peace. America, England, and France, it can be (Source: SCCD, Fond [collection] 5, Opis [in-
sis, 1958-1961 ) and No. 6 (Vladislav M. Zubok,
said, support the maintenance of the status quo. ventory] 49, Delo [file] 235, Listy [pages] 89- Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-
Therefore, a relaxation of relations with the USA, 96.)
1962) ).]
England, and France is possible. And in certain
Soviet leaders obviously realized that
cases the possibility even of joint efforts with
Ulbricht s solution would posed an unacceptable
these capitalist powers against West Germany
risk of war, and hoped similar calculations in
and Japan is not excluded. West Germany, said
Washington and Bonn would produce a compro-
Mao Tse-Tung, represents a danger not only for
mise such as recognition of two German states
us, but also for the capitalist countries of the
with a special settlement for Berlin. But FRG
West.
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer s tenacity, coupled
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 59
DOCUMENTATION
with the disastrous turn in U.S.-Soviet ties after vividly the mood and dilemma of the Soviet leader 1961]...Kennedy spoke [to frighten us] and then
the May 1960 U-2 affair, left Khrushchev with at the peak of the crisis. His address graphically got scared himself. (p. 141)
little room for maneuver. He tried to gain time by reveals the contortions he had to go through when
postponing further action in Berlin until after the taking the decision to build the Wall. But one Immediately after Kennedy delivered his
U.S. presidential elections in November, but any thing that stands out in this text is Khrushchev s speech I spoke with [U.S. envoy John J. McCloy].
hope that John F. Kennedy would help him out of political realism even at the moment of his boldest We had a long conversation, talking about disar-
his predicament proved wishful thinking. gambling. He did not want to drive Kennedy into mament instead of talking, as we needed to, about
By Spring 1961, Khrushchev s time was a corner, cognizant of domestic pressures on him Germany and conclusion of a peace treaty on
running out. The deepening Sino-Soviet rift ren- and confident he could get away with dividing West Berlin. So I suggested: come to my place
dered his authority as a communist leader more Berlin. Introduction, commentary, and transla- [Black Sea resort in Pitsunda] tomorrow and we
precarious than ever. Beijing and other militant tion by Vladislav M. Zubok, formerly of the USA/ will continue our conversation. (p. 141)
communists blamed the Soviets for putting agree- Canada Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences,
ments with the West ahead of their international- Moscow, currently a visiting scholar at the Nor- On the first day [in Pitsunda] before talking
ist revolutionary duty and among the East Ger- wegian Nobel Institute, Oslo. we followed a Roman rite by taking a swim in a
man communists there was less sympathy for pool. We got our picture taken, embraced
Moscow s foreign policy than for the Chinese, * * * * * together...I have no idea whom he is going to
who had only recently tried to liberate their show this picture to, but I don t care to appear on
own imperialist-occupied territory, the off- The Conference of first secretaries of Cen- one picture with a Wall Street representative in
shore islands in the Taiwan straits. In March, at tral Committees of Communist and workers the Soviet pool.
a regular Warsaw Pact summit, Khrushchev parties of socialist countries for the exchange
promised to conclude a separate peace treaty of views on the questions related to prepara- I said [to McCloy]: I don t understand
with the GDR should a general settlement with tion and conclusion of German peace treaty, 3- what sort of disarmament we can talk about,
the West prove impossible, and by early June it when Kennedy in his speech declared war on us
5 August 1961.
certainly looked this way from Moscow: Kennedy and set down his conditions. What can I say?
had attempted to roll back communism in Please tell your president that we accept his
Second session. 4 August. Morning. Present on
Cuba at the Bay of Pigs and came to the Vienna ultimatum and his terms and will respond in
the Soviet side: Nikita S. Khrushchev, Frol Kozlov,
summit with Khrushchev with nothing new to say kind. (p. 142)
Anastas Mikoyan, Andrei Gromyko. Foreign
on the German Question. In accord with his
guests: Walter Ulbricht (GDR), Todor Zhivkov
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