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quent operations.
Had U.S. forces faced stiffer [Panamanian Defense Force] resistance
in Panama City, for example, they would probably have found that
they had received inadequate preparation and training for military
operations in urban terrain (MOUT). Had U.S. forces encountered
violent or even passive civilian opposition to the invasion, they could
14. Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20
Low Intensity Con: ict.
15. Ronald H. Cole, Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations
in Panama (Joint History Of9 ce, Of9 ce of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995);
Jennifer Morrison Taw, Operation Just Cause: Lessons for Operations Other than War (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, Arroyo Center, 1996).
Doctrine and Education for the New Force " 137
have found themselves involved in an unconventional urban con: ict
requiring manpower they did not have and riot control, MOUT, and
counterinsurgency operations for which they were neither trained
nor prepared.16
In sum, for those who thought a highly trained combat force could
conduct smaller operations without changing doctrine, education, or
training, Panama should have been a wake-up call. Operation Provide
Comfort and Operation Restore Hope only con9 rmed this reality in the
three years that followed. Between the invasion of Panama and the 1993
publication of the revised FM 100-5 Operations and the brand-new JP
(joint publication) 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, U.S. troops faced sim-
ilar challenges in northern Iraq and Somalia. Guided by the offensively
oriented AirLand Battle Doctrine paradigm, it is no surprise that the
Army adopted an aggressive approach in carving out security zones in
northern Iraq and establishing control of southern Somalia. 17 Likewise,
a quick offensive to seize the port, the air9 eld, and the U.S. embassy
characterized the Marine Corps landing in Somalia, where a severe
paucity of intelligence, cultural awareness, and strategic guidance frus-
trated the planning efforts by Marine Expeditionary Unit commander
Colonel Greg Newbold.18
Upon landing and assessing the situation in Somalia, marines still
found themselves without the doctrine, capacity, or authority to carry out
missions such as food distribution and the capture and detention of war-
lords.19 As a result of such frustrations, valuable lessons for dealing with
NGOs, refugees, other civilians, and allies were learned in these two op-
erations and would be re: ected in subsequent MOOTW manuals devel-
oped throughout the decade. Unfortunately, some of the lessons
recorded into doctrine were based more on a hopeful vision of future
operations than on reality. Speci9 cally, JP 3-08, which outlines inter-
agency operations, suggests myriad tasks civilian agencies would be ex-
16. Taw, Operation Just Cause.
17. Rose, FM 3-0 Operations, 71. For a discussion of the inappropriate use of force
see Appendix C, Operations in Somalia, in Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-06
Urban Operations (Formerly FM 90-10) (Washington, DC, June 1, 2003); C. Kenneth Allard,
Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,
1995).
18. General (Ret.) Tom Clancy, USMC, Anthony Zinni, and Tony Koltz, Battle Ready
(New York: Putnam, 2004); Rose, FM 3-0 Operations. See also numerous news reports,
December 1992, Washington Post and New York Times. Lieutenant General (Ret.) Gregory
Newbold, USMC, numerous personal interviews by author, June July 2005, Arlington, VA.
19. Newbold, interviews.
138 " lifting the fog of peace
pected to perform in future Somalia-like operations. These ideas
emerged through after-action seminars and simulations that sought to
improve civil-military coordination for future operations. As discussed in
chapter 6, the fact that such agencies lacked the capability and capacity
to conduct these tasks was not clear to the theorists and doctrine writers
at the time but would become painfully evident during the Iraq cam-
paign starting in 2003. In 1993, however, compared to previous eras, it
was signi9 cant that the new FM 100-5 and JP 3-0 mentioned these types
of missions and these myriad nonmilitary actors at all.
Doctrine Development for the New World Order
The 1993 versions of JP 3-0 and FM 100-5 were the 9 rst post-Vietnam op-
erations manuals to include entire chapters on operations other than
war. These mark the beginning of a new generation of manuals that
sought to capture lessons from ongoing operations of the 1990s (table
4). Previous versions of FM 100-5 in the 1960s had contained chapters
on unconventional warfare operations, military operations against ir-
regular forces, and situations short of war (as part of President
TABLE 4. The Next Generation of MOOTW and Stability Operations Doctrine
Manual Year Notes
FM 100-5 Operations 1993 Revised to include MOOTW chapter
JP 3-0 Joint Operations 1993 Included MOOTW chapter
FM 100-23 Peace Operations 1994 Promoted by Army s Peacekeeping Institute
JP 3-07 MOOTW 1995 Entire joint manual devoted to MOOTW
JP 3-08 Interagency (vols. 1 and 2) 1996 Incorporated lessons from previous
operations
Joint Task Force Commander s 1997 Operational level manual for commanders
Handbook for Peace
Operations
JP 3-07.3 Tactics, Techniques, and 1999 Tactics, techniques, and procedures for
Procedures for Peace Operations peace operations
FM 3-0 Operations 2001 Introduced Full Spectrum Operations ;
replaced FM 100-5
FM 3-07.31 Tactics, Techniques, and 2003 Multiservice manual developed by ALSA
Procedures for Peace Operations with Peacekeeping Institute
FM 3-07 Stability and Support 2003 Replaced the MOOTW term
Operations
FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency 2006 Driven by General Petraeus
FM 3-0 Operations 2008 Socialized Full Spectrum Ops
FM 3-07 Stability and Support 2008 Published by University of Michigan Press
Operations
Doctrine and Education for the New Force " 139
Kennedy s attempted emphasis on counterinsurgency) but still were of-
fensively focused.20 No mention of anything other than major warfare
had been included in this critical manual since the end of the Vietnam
War. In 1982, AirLand Battle Doctrine was introduced and remained the
focus through the 1986 revision.21 The following discussion outlines the
substantive changes made in some of the key manuals listed in table 4
and the behind-the-scenes debates and processes by which they were
published.
Army FM 100-5 Operations
In 1993, FM 100-5 acknowledged, Today, the Army is often required, in
its role as a strategic force, to protect and further the interests of the
United States at home and abroad in a variety of ways other than war.
Chapter 13, Operations other than War, signaled an expansion from
the concepts developed in LIC doctrine. Perhaps more important, by in-
cluding this chapter in FM 100-5, the Army s primary operations 9 eld
manual, the authors were acknowledging that MOOTW/LIC was no
longer a mission for the Special Operations Forces alone. Yet with the
opening sentence of the chapter stating clearly that the Army s primary
focus is to 9 ght and win the nation s wars, the strategic ambiguity and
political debate over using U.S. forces for MOOTW rang loud and clear.
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